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Empathic projection in the films of the Dardenne brothers 
RICHARD RUSHTON 
 
A number of commentators have engaged with the moral or ethical dimensions of the 
feature films of Jean-Pierre and Luc Dardenne; rather less attention has been paid to 
their style. What has been written of the films’ stylistic traits – and my focus here is on 
La promesse/The Promise (1996), Rosetta (1999), Le fils/The Son (2002), L’enfant/The 
Child (2005), Le silence de Lorna/The Silence of Lorna (2008) and Le gamin au 
vélo/The Kid with a Bike (2011) – has most often been a matter of linking style to the 
films’ moral messages. Some key terms describing that style have emerged from this 
context, with terms such as ‘proximity’ and ‘realism’ prominent among them. The 
former denotes the Dardennes’ penchant for placing the camera very close to 
characters’ bodies, while the latter relates to commentators’ praise for the Dardennes’ 
‘responsible realism’ or ‘sensuous realism’.1 Such claims are certainly valid, though 
they could be more nuanced. This essay focuses on aspects of style in the Dardennes’ 
films, but does not aim to link these stylistic procedures to notions of ethics, 
concentrating instead on the tension between realist and modernist styles. I then relate 
these stylistic traits to the ways in which the films evoke emotional sympathy in viewers 
while also producing a sense of detached distanciation. This dual mode, that combines 
realism with modernism as well as sympathy with distanciation, provides a very 
particular sort of viewing experience. Drawing on the writings of art historian Michael 
Fried, as well as those of philosopher Stanley Cavell, I call this experience one of 
‘empathic projection’. 
 Daniel Frampton claims that the films of the Dardenne brothers ‘almost entirely 
reject some key conventions of fiction filmmaking (shot/reverse shot, point of view 
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shots, establishing shots, and so on) in favour of a close and empathic form’.2 In doing 
so, Frampton claims, ‘the films show us a concern, an empathy for the characters’.3 This 
empathic relationship, he continues, is created for the most part by the camera placing 
us very close to the characters. In The Son, for example, ‘There is almost no space, no 
measurable distance between filmgoer/film and father’. What is thus created is ‘a pure 
relationship between character and filmgoer’.4 Frampton then theorizes this pure 
relationship in terms of a notion of ‘being-with’, inspired by Martin Heidegger’s 
conception of Mitsein. All of this adds up to an attractive characterization of what the 
Dardennes are doing: an empathic form of filmmaking and film viewing combined with 
a philosophically inspired bodily fusion of characters and filmic space. These are 
powerful statements, and are in fact somewhat overstated. Frampton claims that there is 
almost no space between filmgoer and character, but the almost is significant, for the 
space between filmgoer and character is an important aspect of the Dardennes’ style. 
And as for a ‘pure relationship’ between filmgoer and character, I am uncertain as to 
whether such a thing exists, for all relationships are mediated in ways that render them 
impure in one way or another – that is what makes them ‘relationships’. 
 Like Frampton, Joseph Mai stresses the ways in which the Dardennes reject 
conventional modes of filmmaking. Their films and many of the scenes within them 
start in the middle of the action – in media res – so that, as Mai puts it, ‘The Dardennes’ 
frames emphasize a lack of external point of view’.5 Often viewers enter the action 
without quite knowing what is happening, where the action is set or where it is going. 
Of significance here is the minimal use of establishing shots. Mai also notes that the 
Dardennes favour long takes, and few commentators would disagree: the plan séquence 
is indeed one of the main components of the Dardennes’ style. 
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 Mai focuses on the Dardennes’ own conception of a ‘body-camera’ (corps-
caméra). This term describes how the camera acts like another body at the scene of the 
action – the handheld shooting so often used in the Dardennes’ films certainly gives the 
impression of a camera that is attached to a body, a body that moves, shakes and turns 
its head like a human. Additionally, the notion of the body-camera is one that describes 
the particular connection the Dardennes’ camera has with the bodies of characters, and 
we have already seen Frampton hinting at this idea. With the camera itself acting like a 
body, Mai claims, both it and we are drawn into a bodily relationship with the 
characters in the films. Here, then, ‘vision is not an independent entity, but is reseated in 
the body, or rather in two bodies involved in a dancelike movement through other 
bodies’.6 Mai thus claims that the Dardennes offer a vision that is not merely optical but 
also, or predominantly, bodily and ‘haptic’.7 
 In common with many other commentators, Sarah Cooper argues that the 
Dardennes aim for ‘novelty’, that they want to ‘break cinematic codes’ and ‘shake 
cinematic preconceptions’.8 Like Frampton, Cooper claims that that the camera and the 
viewer are to some extent with characters (‘being-with’), but also and crucially that the 
camera is ever so slightly removed. The camera is more often than not behind 
characters, so that ‘our frequent point of view is of some part of their backs’.9 This is an 
important point for Cooper, because it means viewers do not straightforwardly identify 
with characters: we do not see from characters’ point of view but instead from slightly 
behind them. Of the Dardennes’ characters – pointing specifically to Igor (Jérémie 
Renier) in The Promise, Rosetta (Émilie Dequenne) in Rosetta and Olivier (Olivier 
Gourmet) in The Son – Cooper writes that ‘we see them without being able to be them’ 
and, as a result, we are ‘position[ed] firmly outside of the characters’ lives’.10 In short, 
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we do not identify with characters in the ways that we seem to identify with characters 
in many conventional films. 
 These claims lead to what is Cooper’s most interesting point regarding the 
Dardennes’ style. While identification in the cinema has traditionally been a matter of 
‘stepping into someone else’s shoes’, what occurs with the Dardennes’ filmmaking is 
more akin to what Cooper calls ‘substitution’.11 (Cooper’s analysis is heavily influenced 
by French ethical philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, for whom ‘substitution’ is a key 
term.) This is a matter of being placed close to the characters, without being put in the 
same place as the characters, and Cooper argues that this occurs as a process of 
proximity rather than one of straightforward empathy or identification. Luc Dardenne 
has himself named this aspect of the brothers’ filmmaking, calling this distance between 
the camera and character the space of the ‘secret’.12 This is precisely a space of the 
unknown and the unknowable, because we can never truly know what another person is 
thinking or feeling or seeing – it is ‘secret’. By way of the secret, therefore, the mystery 
and otherness of the other person is respected and maintained. We do not presume to 
know what the other person is seeing, thinking or feeling. We do not identify with them. 
 For Cooper, it is this distance from characters maintained by the camera that 
allows for the very particular effect of the Dardennes’ style. We get very close to 
characters, but are never quite with them. She sums up her points in the following way: 
It explains how we can be moved without replicating or sharing the embodied 
emotions we see on screen … to engage with the soul of these films is thus to 
replicate the impossibility of stepping into the characters’ positions to see as 
they see, to feel as they feel.13 
Each of these approaches to the Dardennes’ style offers a rich engagement with the 
particularities of the camerawork and the senses of address offered by the films. For 
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Frampton, emphasis is placed on the notion of being-with, while for Mai the ‘dance’ of 
the body-camera is paramount. Cooper, significantly, places emphasis on the minimal 
distance the camera keeps from the characters, so that the viewer’s vision of events and 
sympathy for the characters is always at one remove from the experiences of the 
characters themselves. Much could be made of these aspects of the Dardennes’ 
techniques using Murray Smith’s distinction between allegiance and alignment, 
according to which, allegiance pertains to the Dardennes’ central characters but not to 
character alignment. Subjective access – that is, access to the internal subjective states 
of characters, or what Smith calls ‘alignment’ – is very much downplayed in the 
Dardennes’ films.14 However, the stakes of their techniques owe more to the contexts of 
modernist aesthetic strategies than Smith might be prepared to countenance. 
 In a short journalistic piece published in 1999 in Cahiers du cinéma, Jacques 
Rancière discusses Rosetta in terms of a combination of realist and modernist 
tendencies.15 Surprisingly, no commentators appear to have followed up Rancière’s 
approach, for it opens up some interesting ways of thinking about the Dardennes’ style. 
While the commentators examined so far all attribute a certain singularity to that style, 
Rancière instead proposes a double process. Where these commentators base their 
analyses on an ‘either/or’ logic in the Dardennes’ style, Rancière discovers a logic of 
‘both/and’. 
 The notion of doubling opens up some fertile theoretical terrain. In what 
follows, I call upon a number of doubled terms, though not in order to resolve them or 
to favour one term over the other. Rather, I examine how these terms work together in 
the Dardennes’ films. I explore primarily the terms of realism/modernism and 
sympathy/distanciation, but those of immersion/specularity and display/privacy are also 
in contention. These pairs of terms eventually lead to the notion of ‘empathic 
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projection’. We have already seen some sense of this term emerge in Cooper’s 
reflections, for empathic projection is essentially the imaginative act of putting yourself 
in some else’s shoes: that is, not being in someone else’s shoes, but imagining what it 
might be like; to try to think what another person is thinking, to feel what another is 
feeling. These issues are central to the Dardennes’ stylistic concerns. 
 Rancière, in his short piece on Rosetta (which also discusses Bruno Dumont’s 
L’Humanité [1999]), opens up the dimensions of the Dardennes’ double strategy, and 
finds that this doubling occurs at two levels – the doubling is itself doubled. At the level 
of narrative the doubling consists of realist description and generic theme, while at the 
level of style Rancière again claims that the Dardennes adopt realist strategies despite 
remaining resolutely modernist. Rancière’s point is that neither of these strategies 
typically belongs together: narrative realism is usually opposed to the cliches of genre, 
whereas the Dardennes manage to place realism and genre on the same plane. Much the 
same goes for style: realism has typically been placed in opposition to modernism, so 
for the Dardennes to combine realism with modernism is something of a double play.16 
 At the level of narrative in Rosetta, therefore, a description of the sordid, 
embattled conditions of everyday life – of Rosetta’s day-to-day struggle to stay alive – 
is combined with a generic appeal to the classic theme of the ‘dignity of the people’. 
Thus the film deploys two intertwined aspects of narrative style. The first of these is 
indebted, so Rancière argues, to Gustave Flaubert – Rancière calls it a ‘Bovary effect’. 
Attention to the detail and minutiae of material existence – exemplified by Rosetta’s 
rituals of changing her shoes for boots, of caressing her painful belly with her hand and 
warming it with a hairdryer, of rigging a makeshift fishing contraption in order to obtain 
some food – along with the many brutal closeups of her pained, desperate and 
determined expressions (Rancière calls them ‘monstrous’), are related to a line of realist 
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description in the film that is indebted to nineteenth-century novelists such as 
Flaubert.17 But it is not only realist depiction that is at stake, for Rosetta also fulfils the 
elements of a classic (albeit modern) genre: that of the ‘dignity of the people’.18 The 
Dardennes offer tales of the virtues and grandeur of ‘the people’, and Rosetta is 
certainly a representative ‘type’. Such types are related to the Brechtian Gestus, a link 
made by Rancière, but they might also be related to Eisensteinian typage as much as to 
Victor Hugo’s larger-than-life representative types. Rancière thus discovers two aspects 
of narrative style: realism combined with a classic generic theme. 
 At the level of style, realism is certainly prominent, and most commentators on 
the Dardennes attribute to them a realism of one order or another. But Rancière’s 
eyebrow-raising claim is that realism in Rosetta is combined with a modernist stylistic 
impulse indebted to Brechtian mannerism. In this respect, Rancière goes so far as to 
label Rosetta ‘Daughter Courage’ (after Brecht’s Mother Courage).19 For Rancière, 
then, the Dardennes’ method is indebted to various strategies of realism, but this realism 
is combined with a modernist didacticism, as though Rosetta is very much a ‘learning 
film’ in the manner of Brecht’s notion of the Lehrstück. 
 To draw out Rancière’s claim of doubling, some fairly detailed analysis of 
specific scenes from the Dardennes’ films is necessary, but a close focus on these 
aspects can shed light on the stylistic operations shared by the films. The consequences 
of the analysis of these scenes and their modes of doubling can ultimately be articulated 
in terms of ‘empathic projection’. 
 While it seems generally to be true, as already noted, that there are virtually no 
point-of-view shots, shot/reverse-shots, establishing shots or suturing effects in the 
Dardennes’ films, and while it is also the case that the Dardennes’ camera often films 
the backs of characters or the backs of their heads, other repeated procedures in the 
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films appear to have been overlooked. What is extremely common is the use of a two-
shot from medium distance, about waist high. This allows for the long takes that give 
the scenes the realism identified by many commentators, but significantly this two-shot 
long take combines with what may be the Dardennes’ most persistent cinematic 
technique: a single take of a conversation between two characters in which a handheld 
camera moves back and forth between the interlocutors. The strategy seems indebted to 
direct cinema, not surprisingly given the Dardennes’ many years as documentary 
filmmakers, and is one that also features prominently in the work of contemporary 
North American independent filmmakers such as Hal Hartley and Richard Linklater. 
The back-and-forth movement produces a sense that the camera is there on the scene, 
capturing raw events as they unfold. It is significant, too, that this method works as 
something of a replacement for the shot/reverse-shots found in more traditional 
conversation setups. Instead of viewing characters more or less face-on or in three-
quarter face, we tend to view them from side-on as they speak to each other. This side-
on view seems every bit as prevalent, if not more so, as the brothers’ more famed view 
from the behind the head. 
 Many scenes in the Dardennes’ films hinge on this combination of two-shot and 
back-and-forth conversation structure. Quite early on in The Promise, for example, Igor 
arrives late for work at the garage where he is apprenticed. During the conversation that 
ensues between Igor and the mechanic, we very rarely see the two characters framed 
together in a single shot, but instead the handheld camera moves back and forth in an 
agitated way between the characters, its movements jittery and inexact. The mechanic 
berates Igor for his lateness, Igor blames his tardiness on his father, and then the 
mechanic comments on the tattoo on Igor’s arm. 
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 The Promise, contains scenes throughout in which two characters are framed in 
the same shot from about waist height or a little more tightly, for example when Igor 
and Roger (Olivier Gourmet) sing a duet at the karaoke bar, or towards the end of the 
film when Assita (Assita Ouedraogo) stands at the side of the road with her sick baby, 
trying to hitch a lift to hospital. Igor approaches her and she asks him whether her 
husband, Amidou (Rasmane Ouedraogo) is dead; ‘He’s not dead’, Igor lies. This is all 
captured in a close two-shot – from about chest up for each of the characters – with each 
character side-on to the camera.  
 The crucial final scene at the train station combines the two-shot and the back-
and-forth in a single setup.20 Assita walks towards the platform with Igor beside her, 
while the camera travels alongside them both. As Assita turns to go up the station steps 
(she is purportedly going to visit relatives in Italy), Igor finally tells her the truth about 
Amidou’s death. The rest of the scene unfolds in one continuous take. The camera 
follows Assita briefly as she stops on the second or third step (Igor is no longer in the 
shot), then sways back to capture Igor, cutting Assita out of the frame. ‘He fell from 
scaffold’, Igor says. As he continues to explain, the camera sways back to Assita; we 
see her from behind, and this time Igor is pushed out of the frame. The camera sways 
again back to Igor before finally returning to Assita. She comes back down the steps 
and turns to face him – both are now in the frame – and in the final shot of the film they 
walk away together, back in the direction from which they came. This shot thus features 
a number of sways back-and-forth, while also allowing for moments in which both 
characters are in the frame (what I have been calling a ‘two-shot’).21 
 The Dardennes’ camera is perhaps at its most restless in Rosetta, and certainly 
on a par with The Son in this regard, but there are significant moments when the two-
shot setup is used. Midway through the film, Rosetta goes after work with Riquet 
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(Fabrizio Rongione) to his flat, where they chat over dinner and a beer. In the central 
and longest shot of the scene, both are seated at a table with the camera, very still, 
framing them in a two-shot composition. When Riquet gets up from the table to grab 
another beer from the fridge, the camera follows his actions – thus leaving Rosetta out 
of the shot – and when he subsequently returns to the table and sits back down, the 
camera resumes its stillness and framing of both characters. 
 Later in the film, when Rosetta has told the waffle boss (Olivier Gourmet) that 
Riquet is swindling him by selling waffles on the side, the confrontation that ensues in 
the waffle cart unfolds in a single take. As the boss fires Riquet, the camera is 
momentarily located alongside Rosetta at the back door of the cart, ‘watching’ the 
confrontation between the two men. The camera then sways back to a close view of the 
side of Rosetta’s face as she watches the events. Rosetta intervenes in order to show the 
boss where Riquet has hidden the extra waffles he proposes to sell, and the camera 
follows her actions. Rather than a two-shot, here we have a three-shot – with all three 
characters in the frame. We are shown a range of relationships between the characters, 
while never seeing events from anyone’s particular point of view. At the same time 
there is a sense in which the camera seems something of an observer, and thus we too 
feel we are there ‘on the scene’ – watching events unfold before our very eyes. 
 In The Kid with a Bike, the young boy Cyril (Thomas Doret) finally tracks down 
and visits his father, Guy (Jérémie Renier), at a restaurant, where he is preparing food in 
anticipation of the lunchtime opening. For the first quarter of the film Cyril has been 
searching desperately for his father, so this scene is a crucial one. The central shot is 
again a very long continuous take. It begins with a simple two-shot as Cyril and Guy 
chat at what seems to be a drinks service counter; the camera then swings around to 
follow Guy as he walks to the kitchen area to continue his prepping for the lunch 
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service. Cyril follows him and they talk together; Guy unpacks some food and stirs 
some pots, then lets Cyril do some stirring too. Both of the characters are in the shot, 
but seen from a far greater distance than in the passages from The Promise and Rosetta 
discussed above. The same features apply, however: a mobile camera that follows the 
movements of characters as they converse; a typical two-shot setup featuring a pair of 
characters in frame as they speak to each other; no point-of-view shots and no 
shot/reverse-shot setups. In the middle of this, Guy summons up the courage to say to 
Cyril, ‘I can’t have you back’, delivering the declaration that he is abandoning his son. 
 There are two notable outcomes of these setups that seem to typify the 
Dardennes’ filming methods. While Frampton’s conception of ‘being-with’, Mai’s 
notion of dancelike bodies and Cooper’s analysis of proximity all illuminate the 
Dardennes’ techniques to some extent, the setups discussed here disclose a slightly 
different and more important stylistic conception, and deliberately retard access to the 
interior of characters. They do not allow us to get ‘inside’ a character in the way that 
many Hollywood (and other) films do, which is to some extent a result of the fact that 
we rarely get to see a character face-on. We are more likely to see them from behind or, 
as I have described, from side-on. It is tempting to declare the Dardennes’ strategy as 
the direct opposite of the front-on, shot/reverse-shots revered by a director such as Ozu 
Yasujiro, who typically has his characters in full face, looking almost directly at the 
camera. Where Ozu favours editing between characters, the Dardennes eschew editing 
in favour of the plan sequence, with two characters occupying the frame while in 
conversation, combined with a back-and-forth between them. Like Ozu, the Dardennes 
still favour a closeness to characters, but the handheld camera usually makes this 
closeness feel jittery and disturbing. This contrast with Ozu is interesting, for the front-
on, full faces of his conversation sequences impress upon us the honesty or sincerity of 
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his characters – their faces are rendered ‘open’, as it were. The Dardennes’ characters, 
by contrast, impress upon us a kind of ‘hiddenness’, as though they are hiding 
something within themselves – their faces are ‘closed’.22 This phrase is significant. The 
Dardennes’ techniques I have been describing – a two-shot and a back-and-forth – are 
also combined with a blankness of expression in the characters that is, in ways noted by 
Rancière, positively Brechtian.23 More accurately, perhaps, the Dardennes’ debt here, 
which they willingly acknowledge, is to Robert Bresson. Igor, Rosetta, Bruno, Olivier, 
Lorna and Cyril are all in a sense ‘blank’, lacking expressive depth.24 Because we very 
rarely get to see characters face-on, or even in three-quarter shot, our access to them – 
to their ‘insides’ – is very deliberately blocked. 
 In general terms this is a feature of the combination of realism and modernism: 
realism gives us detail, while modernism delivers a certain abstraction. At the level of 
narrative, realism gives us something that seems realistic – the handheld camera, its 
shakiness that appears to place us ‘on the scene of reality’, the chronicling of the details 
of everyday life and the struggle to stay alive – while the generic elements also make 
the narrative mannered, as though we were being exposed to morality tales or fables 
rather than to realist narratives. Some commentators have criticized the films for this, as 
though the Dardennes were merely pretending to be realists while actually offering 
melodramatic morality tales – the combination of realism and generic theme dismissed 
as an aberration, the generic traits undermining the call to reality. David Walsh is 
especially critical: ‘In the end, the filmmakers are reduced to moralizing about what 
individuals do and wagering on their capacity to listen to their better selves. … This 
comes perilously close to middle class sermonizing, preaching virtue to the 
downtrodden.’25 
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 I would propose a rather more sympathetic take on the Dardennes’ combination 
of realism and mannerism–modernism. If their characters seem to lack expressive depth 
or to be hiding their thoughts and feelings from us, this does not mean emotional depth 
or content is lacking – quite the contrary, in fact. Unlike the overt emotional displays 
typical of many Hollywood films, the constrained expressions of the Dardennes’ 
characters make us think they are bottling up their emotions deep within, so that we do 
not think these characters are unemotional but instead that they must be so overcome 
with emotion that they cannot even outwardly express it.26 The Dardennes’ characters 
do not display their emotion as though it were a public product or sign; they keep their 
emotions private, inside, to themselves.27 
 The Dardennes’ films therefore offer what seems to be a very different 
emotional engagement from that typically produced in mainstream cinema. In this 
regard it is distinct from what Carl Plantinga has called ‘the scene of empathy’. 
Plantinga describes such scenes in Hollywood films as typically involving a closeup of 
a character offering a display of emotion which viewers may then, in one way or 
another, ‘catch’. Drawing on terms from cognitive psychology – ‘affective mimicry’ 
and ‘emotional contagion’ – Plantinga’s claim is that ‘the viewer shares some of the 
experience the character is thought to have, possibly in an automatic and unconscious 
way’.28 This kind of experience – the scene of empathy – is most likely to occur in what 
Plantinga calls sympathetic narratives, which he contrasts with distanced narratives. The 
former use techniques favouring emotional absorption and bold solicitation of emotion, 
while the latter are more reflexively selfconscious and defamiliarizing.29 
 The Dardennes, we might think, tend towards these selfconscious and 
defamiliarizing cinematic forms, placing their filmmaking at odds with Hollywood’s 
overt emotional displays: in other words, they seem to offer distanced narratives rather 
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than sympathetic ones. Plantinga charts in Brechtian terms a distinction between the 
kinds of films that eschew overt emotion – distanced narratives – and those that feature 
bold emotional displays – sympathetic narratives: distanced narratives enable thought, 
while sympathetic narratives disable thought. But he is also very critical of the 
simplicities implied by this distinction: ‘there is nothing’, he argues, ‘in the elicitation 
of strong sympathetic emotions that prima facie could be said to disable critical thought. 
Sympathetic emotions may also encourage critical thought about social and political 
conditions.’30 
 While Plantinga maintains a distinction between sympathy and distanciation in 
order to claim that the scene of empathy, sympathy or emotional display in a film does 
not necessarily retard critical engagement – he favours sympathetic narratives – I want 
to claim instead that what is integral to the Dardennes’ strategy, allied with their 
doubling of realism with modernism, is a combination of sympathy and distance. In 
trying to make sense of this combination, it is important to bear in mind its intention: 
what it is the Dardennes are trying to do, and what the point of their strategies might be. 
It may relate to Plantinga’s claim that if we are to be emotionally engaged by films then 
there must be occasions when ‘the viewer shares some of the experience the character is 
thought to have’.31 This sharing of a character’s experience will amount, in due course, 
to an experience of empathic projection, of imagining what it is like to be in someone 
else’s shoes. If we share some of the experiences of the Dardennes’ characters – and I 
think if we are at all interested in these films that we do – then as I have already stated, 
this sharing is not a result of seeing things from the characters’ point of view. But nor 
do we share these characters’ emotions by virtue of their overt emotional displays: there 
are no emphatic ‘scenes of empathy’ such as those foregrounded by Plantinga. In the 
Dardennes’ films, where we are typically offered only a side-on view of a face or are 
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confronted by a character’s back, there is most often a reservation about the display of 
emotion, a certain blankness or bottling up of feeling in the characters.32  
 What we are faced with in the Dardennes’ characters is in fact what Fried calls 
‘absorption’ in painting. I have previously attempted to draw upon Fried’s notion of 
absorption for thinking about cinema, such that absorption comes close to describing 
the kind of narrative engagement – being ‘caught up in a narrative’ – that pertains to the 
classical narrative cinema in ways similar to Plantinga’s notion of sympathetic 
narratives.33 Fried contrasts absorption with theatricality, where theatricality in the first 
instance designates a kind of distanciation. To be boldly Brechtian about such issues, 
absorption indicates ‘narrative enchantment’ while theatricality indicates a certain 
‘knowingness’ and self-reflexivity about the conditions of address – a knowingness of 
display, an understanding that any work of art is a type of theatre addressed to an 
audience. In short, Fried’s distinction between absorption and theatricality could be said 
to map easily onto the distinction drawn above between sympathy and distanciation. 
 And yet these distinctions are not so clear cut. If theatricality designates an overt 
display to, and solicitation of, the viewer’s attention and responsiveness, then the 
sympathetic scene of empathy described by Plantinga would seem to fit that description, 
being an overt display of emotion that viewers are supposed to catch. In other words, 
this raises the issue of whether sympathy might denote some kind of absorption in a 
cinematic narrative or whether, conversely, it is of a rather more theatrical design. And 
if my claim here is that the Dardennes combine sympathy and distanciation, this merely 
seems to confuse further any notion of absorption or theatricality. And if I am trying to 
work towards a point in the Dardennes’ films at which ‘the viewer shares some of the 
experience the character is thought to have’ – that is, experiences empathic projection – 
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then in what ways can terms like sympathy, distanciation, absorption or theatricality 
help in clarifying this kind of experience? 
 In his recent work, Fried has tried to chart a kind of prehistory of absorption, in 
which he argues that Caravaggio is probably the first painter in the western tradition to 
‘discover’ absorption. This discovery was a matter of painting figures that were in many 
ways inexpressive, lacking in overt emotional display. Yet far from concealing 
emotional expression, this inexpressiveness instead allowed viewers to project 
emotional intensity onto or into the depicted figures. It is this projection that brings 
about the discovery of absorption, which Fried calls ‘a momentous discovery’: 
the discovery that a powerful mode of emotional communication can be actuated 
by absolutely minimal physiognomic and gestural means. Put slightly 
differently, the discovery concerns what viewers, confronted with certain sorts 
of outwardly almost wholly inexpressive figures … spontaneously do … 
namely, read that lack of outward expression as an unmistakable sign of intense 
inwardness and sheer depth of feeling.34 
Fried argues that it is the modes of expressive restraint in painting that granted certain 
subjects in Caravaggio’s canvases the suggestion of deep interior feeling, a depth that 
was sensed and projected by viewers of these paintings in a manner that, after Cavell, 
Fried calls ‘empathic projection’ (Fried’s specific example here is Caravaggio’s 
Penitent Magdalen [1596-97]).35  
 A similar depth of emotional sense can be attributed to the lead characters in the 
Dardennes’ films. This seems to me to be a product of their performative restraint and 
blankness, which along with the side-on shots of their faces allows viewers to 
empathically project a great depth of feeling onto or into these characters. On this count, 
then, empathic projection occurs when, in Plantinga’s words, ‘the viewer shares some of 
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the experience the character is thought to have’. That sharing is, however, a matter of 
the viewer remaining separate from the character and projecting feelings or thoughts 
onto or into that character. In short, this notion is not one of seeing things from a 
character’s point of view or of ‘feeling the same feelings’ as a character; rather, it is one 
of being cut off from but nevertheless emotionally connected to a character at one and 
the same time. In short, there is both a distance maintained from the character as well as 
a sympathy or closeness with the character. Absorption and empathic projection 
therefore require a combination of sympathy and distanciation. 
 A final set of terms will perhaps clarify what is occurring here. As part of his 
prehistory of absorption, Fried tries to theorize the way in which Caravaggio 
approached the act of painting. To do this, Fried comes up with a pair of terms: 
immersion and specularity. Fried makes a distinction between two ‘moments’ which 
might be said to characterize what is at stake in many of Caravaggio’s works. These 
moments are integral to Caravaggio’s method of painting identified by Fried, but Fried 
also understands the painter – here Caravaggio – as being the first viewer of the 
painting, so for Fried these moments pertain also to the act of viewing. The first 
moment is the one of actually making the painting, and Fried attempts to describe this in 
terms of what he calls immersion, because the act of painting is one of trying to get into 
the picture, to be as close to the objects being painted as possible, to the point of being 
fused with the painting. Fried writes,  
I call the ‘moment’ immersive, imagining the painter as so caught up, so 
immersed, in this phase of his work on the painting … as to be less than fully 
aware of any sharp distinction between the painting and himself.36  
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To take this a step further, Fried refers to this moment as one that involves the body 
inasmuch as it accords with a desire for the painter to enter bodily the space of the 
painting.37 
 The notion of immersion is one of going into the painting, and I would like to 
claim that not only does a similar sense of immersion come into play in cinema – the 
sense in which a spectator will forget him or herself and be fused with the image, with 
the mise-en-scene, the characters and their actions – but also that this is especially 
relevant for the Dardennes’ style. As we have seen, commentators are keen to 
foreground the Dardennes’ notion of a body-camera, with Mai highlighting the idea of a 
dance of bodies between camera and character, and Frampton emphasizing the 
closeness of the camera in a manner of ‘being-with’. 
 If, for Fried, immersion indicates one moment of Caravaggio’s method, then the 
other moment is one of specularity. If the moment of immersion is one in which the 
body of the painter–viewer is fused with what is inside the canvas – and for the cinema, 
the moment in which the spectator is fused with the screen images – then the specular 
moment is that of stepping back and away from the canvas in order to register what has 
happened there. It is a moment, writes Fried, ‘of separating or indeed recoiling from the 
painting, of becoming detached from it, which is to say of no longer being immersed in 
the work but rather of seeing it, taking it in, as if for the first time’.38 The specular 
moment is the moment of reflection, of realizing – ‘as if for the first time’ – what has 
been occurring via one’s immersion. My contention is that the Dardennes’ films 
perform precisely this kind of operation: intense moments of immersion which are 
followed – or, more strictly speaking, accompanied by – moments of specularity. 
 Importantly, immersion and specularity form a couple or a ‘double’. They go 
hand in hand, so that immersion already implies the split or break that will happen by 
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way of specularity, and equally the specular moment cannot take place without the 
accompanying moment of immersion. There is an example of this in The Promise, when 
Roger hears that labour inspectors are about to descend on his worksite, which is full of 
illegal immigrant workers he has smuggled into Belgium. He hurriedly asks his son, 
Igor, to alert the illegal workers and clear the site. There are four shots to consider here.  
 In the first shot, having scrambled up house’s staircase to the first floor, Igor 
leans out of a window and shouts up to the illegal worker Amidou, who is working 
higher up on the scaffolding, ‘Amidou! Get outta here,’ Throughout this shot the camera 
peers from ground level, at first framing Amidou but, as Igor sticks his head out of the 
window to shout, the camera joltingly moves so that Igor is now centred in the frame. 
There is no cutting, just the jagged handheld movement which replicates, it seems to 
me, the movements of an observer’s head and eyes as they capture the action unfolding 
before them. Amidou scrambles to get onto a ladder that will enable him to leave the 
scaffolding and the camera sways back to him, in the characteristic back-and-forth 
movement. He hesitates and steps back to turn off his portable radio. All of this adds up 
to what I want to call immersion, a mode of camera movement and action – and thus of 
our seeing and experiencing – that tries to be ‘in’ the picture. The second shot, amid all 
this scrambling and panicking, shows Igor rushing back down the staircase, the camera 
observing him as he jolts around a corner where there is a small landing with a window 
(we are now inside the house). Has he heard something? He stops, goes back and peers 
out of the window. What can he see? The handheld camera, still jittery, follows Igor’s 
movements. We are still in a mode of immersion. In the third shot Igor is now outside. 
The camera is just millimetres from Amidou’s fallen body as Igor rushes to him. He 
turns Amidou over onto his back (we are still immersed). In the fourth shot we come 
upon the moment of specularity. The camera has now retreated to a position several 
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metres away and is static, even though it clearly remains handheld, occupying the 
position of a detached, partially hidden observer. It has stopped its stuttering attempts to 
keep up with the actions of the scene. It is no longer a ‘body-camera’, which is to say its 
mode is no longer one of immersion; rather, the break or split has been made. Here is 
the moment of specularity: we see, at a distance, Igor bent over the prostrate body of 
Amidou. After another edit the camera moves back closer to the characters and one of 
the film’s key moment ensues: the promise referred to in the film’s title. 
 The example offered here is a small-scale one, but the Dardennes’ films are full 
of this combination of immersion and specularity. A notion of immersion can fairly 
straightforwardly be seen as central to the Dardennes’ techniques, There is a sense of 
being bodily conjoined with the image by way of a ‘body-camera’, in ways that 
encourage us to be in or fused with the image. Less attention seems to have been paid to 
the moments of clear repose, of ‘cutting away’, of distancing and separation, which are 
indicative of that mode or moment that Fried calls specularity. There are numerous key 
instances of specularity in the films: the much remarked-upon scene in Rosetta in which 
Rosetta recites a small poem to herself; Rosetta’s moments of retreat to her caravan, 
which often involve her soothing her pained stomach with a hairdryer; the many shots 
of Bruno in The Child, combing the streets of Seraing (the camera typically remains 
distanced from these walks); a brief moment when Sonia hands the newborn Jimmy to 
Bruno to hold; when Bruno and Sonia hire a car and escape for a day out with their 
child; when Bruno stops to buy Sonia a jacket like his own; in The Son, when Olivier 
visits Francis’s (Morgan Marinne) small flat and lies down in his bed; at the end of 
Lorna, when Lorna (Arta Dobroshi) retreats to a small cabin in the forest. 
 I want to draw attention to one other moment that fuses immersion and 
specularity. Towards the end of The Kid with a Bike, Cyril rides his bike through the 
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darkened streets of Seraing. He has been rejected by the local petty crime gangster, Wes 
(Egon Di Mateo), then rebuffed once again by his father, yet we see no tears on his face. 
The camera does not get close to him but stays at a distance, so we see him ride his bike 
as if he is riding to nowhere, fleeing. This a good example of a body-camera technique: 
the camera rides along with Cyril, flowing and floating in a dance-like manner which 
makes the spectator’s bodily rhythms resonate with those of the boy (‘The first escapes 
from childhood are by bike’, Jean-Pierre Dardenne has declared).39 But this shot is 
surely also indicative of a moment of specularity. A crucial point in the plot has been 
reached – Cyril has been finally and categorically rejected by his father – and there is a 
sense of stepping back, of reaching a crossroads, of ‘recoiling’ and reflecting, of 
becoming detached and seeing things in a new light. Cyril knows for sure he will never 
return to live with his father, and he also knows he has mistreated the one person who 
has cared for him, Samantha (Cécile de France). All of these conflicting thoughts and 
feelings, a simultaneous embodiment and reflectiveness, immersion and specularity, are 
at play in this shot. 
 So what, in the end, is empathic projection? It is a matter of stepping into some 
else’s shoes, but only imaginatively or projectively. It is never to actually be in those 
shoes, but is a matter of imagining what it might be like by way of projecting our own 
thoughts and feelings onto or into another person.40 In this way ‘the viewer shares some 
of the experience the character is thought to have’, as Plantinga puts it (though he does 
not, of course, use the language of ‘empathic projection’). Empathic projection thus 
occurs by being simultaneously cut off from as well as emotionally connected with a 
character. It is, I would contend, composed of a combination of immersion and 
specularity. It is also a combination of sympathy and distance, and its effect in the 
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Dardennes’ films is indebted to the double strategy that combines a pulsating realism 
with modernist detachment. 
 In The Claim of Reason, Stanley Cavell describes empathic projection as being 
one way in which we can convince ourselves of the humanness of other humans: 
there may just be other things for you to be, but … my taking you for, seeing 
you as, human depends upon nothing more than my capacity for something like 
empathic projection, and … if this is true then I must settle upon the validity of 
my projection from within my present condition, from within, so to speak, my 
confinement from you. For there would be no way of stepping outside my 
projections.41 
He adds that ‘If I stopped projecting, I would no longer take anything to be human, or 
rather I would see no radical difference between humans and other things’.42 What is at 
issue for Cavell, therefore, is the matter of trying to understand or empathize with 
another person, while at the same time knowing that I can never be in that other 
person’s place, that he can never totally be in their shoes or feel what they feel. Rather, 
separated from them, he can only project what the other might be feeling or thinking; he 
can only imagine what it would be like to be them. Cavell still has reservations – he is 
unsure that empathic projection goes quite far enough in understanding and appreciating 
the other person. He writes, ‘I do not know whether empathic projection is, or is not, a 
sufficient basis for acknowledging the other’s existence’.43 Acknowledgment requires 
something stronger than merely my own confinement, it also requires some sense of a 
promise that I can overcome that confinement. These are problems and challenges for 
humankind as much as they are for philosophy or cinema. 
 In short, this showing of how we can both be with characters and yet also be 
separated from them, both sympathetic and distanced, offers a precise demonstration of 
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the problem of empathic projection. And perhaps that is ultimately what the Dardennes’ 
films are about, and what is at stake for both their characters and their viewers. How can 
we traverse the distance between one human and another, between me and you, between 
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